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NOTES.
JUDICIAL INVALIDATION OF FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY
AGAINST BANK HOLDING COMPANY EXPANSION*
Founder-Chairman of the Bank of America and Chairman of the Board
of Transamerica Corporation, a bank holding company, Amadeo Peter Gian-
nini today controls an empire embracing more than 40% of all banking
offices and 38% of all commercial deposits in five western states.' The Bank
of America, since 1946 the largest bank in the United States, maintains in
California over 500 branch banking offices. 2 Transamerica, in addition to a
substantial minority interest in the Bank of America, 3 holds a majority
interest in forty separate banking systems 4 as well as a growing number of
non-banking corporations.5
*Peoples' Bank v. Eccles, 161 F2d 636 (App. D.C. 1947), cort. granted, 63 Sup. Ct.
55 (Oct. 13, 1947).
1. Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency a; S. 829, E0th Cong., 1st
Sess. 22, 171 (1947) (hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 829). Since 1934, Trans-
america Corporation and the Bank of America (National Trust and Savings Associa-
tion), successors to the Bancitaly Corporation and the Bank of Italy, respectively, have
acquired in Arizona, California, Nevada, Oregon and Washington, 126 banks and 74
additional branches, increasing the number of towns and cities served from 242 to 379.
ibid.
For a general history of the two corporations and the corresponding career of A.P.
Giannini, see DANA, A.P. GIA Nrhn, GrAxTn " TH r WEsr (1947); Saturday Evening
Post, Sept. 13, Sept. 20, Sept. 27, Oct. 4, 1947. See also Hearings before Committee on
Banking and Currency tunder H. Res. 141, pt. 11, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930).
2. As of December 31, 1946, total resources of the Bank of America wero q,765,-
525,192; total deposits, $5,415,850,715. MooDs's MANuAL oF Iorv srix.x'rs, BA:Is, II.-
supA cE, RE. EsrTaT & IxvzsnmNrT TnusTs 258, 1515 (1947) (hereinafter cited as
MfooD-'s) ; STANARD & Poo.% CoeroaniioN REcoRDs A-B 4043 (1947) (hereinafter cited
as SrTA-Din & PooR's). In addition to its 504 California branches, the bank maintains
branches in London and Manila, and recently obtained permission from the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System to open a branch in Tokyo. Moons's 1801,
1821 (Supp. 1947); SwxAnx & Pooa's A-B 4046.
3. Transamerica and its subsidiaries held 22V31% (1,904,037) of Bank of America's
outstanding shares (8,531,710) as of Dec. 31, 1946. Prior to 1937, it held approximately
100%. STAzwARD & PooR's A-B 4047, T-Z 4726. Of further significance is Trans-
america's interest in the National City Bank of New York, the second largest bank in
the United States, represented by 7.23% (448,203) of outstanding shares (6,200,000) as
of Dec. 31, 1946. Id. at T-Z 4726, 4728, L-O 2482.
4. As of Dec. 31, 1946, domestic subsidiaries operated 117 banking offices uith
combined deposits of $1,202,921,120. In addition, a foreign subsidiary, the Banca d'
America e d'Italie, operates many branches in Italy, including Milan, Rome, and
Naples. STANDARD & Poo's T-Z 4726.
5. The most important of these include: Capital Company (real estate), Allied
Building Credits Inc. (real estate financing), Pacific National Fire Insurance Co., Occi-
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The continuing expansion of Giannini interests has encountered almost
from the beginning the bitter, but ineffectual, opposition of nearly every
institution, private or public, operating within the same sphere of influence.
On the one hand, small unit bankers have struggled unsuccessfully against
the branch-banking system developed by the Bank of America.6 On the
other hand, Wall Street itself has met defeat in a titanic battle waged to
secure control of the Transamerica Corporation following an attempt to
impose thereon its own banking standards. But the most serious opposition
to the "Giant of the West" has come from those public officials who fear a
growing concentration of economic power in the traditionally competitive
banking field.
A recent offensive, launched by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System and supported by the other supervisors of federally insured
banks,9-the Comptroller of the Currency 10 and the Federal Deposit In-
dental Life Insurance Co., General Metals Corp., Enterprise Engine and Foundry Co., Add
Precision Products Corp., Columbia River Packers Ass'n, Olympic Frozen Foods, Inc.
STANDARD & PooR's T-Z 4727-8; MOODY'S 869. The aggregate resources of all controlled
non-banking business exceeds $275,000,000. Hearings on S. 829 22, 172.
6. Hearings before Subconmnittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Cvrrcncy
on S. 1782 and H.R. 2, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 177-93, 227-36, 249-51, 256-8, 299-306, 307-29,
360 (1926) (hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1782) ; cf., advertisement in Willows
Journal (California), April 11, 1947, by the First National Bank of Willows, reprinted in
Hearings on S. 829 36.
7. See DANA, op. cit. supra note 1, 173-7, 182-228; Saturday Evening Post, Sept. 27,
1947, pp. 79-82; id., Oct. 4, 1947, pp. 28, 126. For Wall Street's attitude toward the Trans-
america system, see Letter from the Board of Directors to Transamerica Stockholders,
Dec. 9, 1931, in which the Board, then under Wall Street control, stated: "Your Board be-
lieves that it is unsound to link, through a holding company, the ownership and control
of a bank with other unrelated activities, and that it is essential to the complete success
of any bank that it should be operated and publicly regarded as an independent institution
without responsibility for, or connection with, any other business."
8. Among banking authorities, California State Bank Superintendents were the first to
offer resistance by refusing to permit the acquisition of additional branches by the Bank of
America. But, since a rejection of branch applications was followed by the purchase and
operation of independent banks through controlled holding companies, forebears of Trans-
america, and since branch banking was finding increasing support among economists and
politicians, state opposition to Giannini was short-lived. See generally DANA, op. Cit, supra
note 1, 72, 75-6, 88, 94-9, 102, 127-8; Hearings on S. 1782 323-6, 330; Fortune, July, 1947,
pp. 69, 70; CHAPMAN AND WESTERFIELD, BRANCH BANKING 87-92 (1942). Proponents
urged that through an extension of branch banking: 1) greater mobility of funds may be
achieved, 2) otherwise bankless towns may be served, 3) more uniform banking stand-
ards and more expert supervision can be secured, and 4) greater capital can be ac-
cumulated for the needs of an expanding economy. Id. at 7-15. See also, Hearinys on
S. 1782 51, 111-22 (1947) ; Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency under
-H. Res. 141, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 1464 (1930). An explanation of the precipitate col-
lapse of state opposition to Bank of America's branch policy has been attributed in part
-to the political pressure maintained by A.P. Giannini. See Los Angeles Times, Aug. 25,
1926, quoted in 68 CONG. REc. 2168 (1927) ; Saturday Evening Post, Sept. 20, 1947, p. 114.
9. Federal Deposit Insurance automatically covers all banks admitted to member-
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surance Corporation, '1 -is aimed primarily at Transamerica.' 2 Since the
Board's power to act directly against bank holding companies is limited,1 3
and since Congress has not yet acted on proposals for additional legislation,1 4
ship in the Federal Reserve System. 48 STAT. 169 (1933), as amended, 49 STAT. 687
(1935), 12 U.S.C. §264(e) (1940). In addition, state non-member banks may secure
coverage upon application to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 48 STAT. 179
(1933), as amended, 49 STAT. 687 (1935), 12 U.S.C. § 264(f) (2) (1940).
Although National Banks hold Reserve membership, 3S STAT. 251 (1913), 12 U.S.C.
J 282 (1940), their supervision, where not inconsistent with the powers of the Board of
Governors, is entrusted primarily to the Comptroller of the Currency. Supervision of
state member banks is a primary function of the Board of Governors; of state non-
member banks carrying deposit insurance, of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Compare, for ex-ample, Rav. STAT. §5168 (1875), 12 U.S.C. §26 (1940), with 3S STAT.
259 (1913), as amended, 40 STAT. 232 (1917), 44 STAT. 1229 (1927), 48 STAT. 164 (1933),
48 STAT. 971 (1934), 49 STAT. 721 (1935), 12 U.S.C. §321 (1940), and with 48 STAT.
170 (1933), as amended, 49 STAT. 687 (1935), 12 U.S.C. §264(f) (1940).
10. See 78 REP. CO.'MROLLER OF THE CuRR-ycy 5 (1940); Hcarings before Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency on H.R. 2634, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1943).
11. See REP. FDIC 10-11 (1944). See also the statements of Chairman Crowley in
Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency on H.R. 1699, 78th Cong., 1st
Sess. 37-9, 49 (1943).
12. Entrance of the Bank of America into the Federal Reserve System provided
only temporary opportunity for federal restrictions on the extension of branch banking,
since the Banking Act of 1933 authorized National and other Federal Reserve member
banks meeting certain capital requirements to maintain branches to the same extent
permitted under state law to non-member banks. 48 STAT. 164 (1933), as amended, 49'
STAT. 721 (1935), 12 U.S.C. §321 (1940); 48 STAT. 189 (1933), as amended, 49 STAT.
708 (1935), 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1940). See CHAPMAN AND VESTERFIE.D, Op. Cit. Supra"
note 8, at 113-24. Federal banking authorities have, accordingly, directed increasing at-
tention to the holding company or group banking aspect of the Giannini empire. See-
Cagle, Branch, Chain and Group Banking in BANKING STUDIES 131-8 (1941). Objec-
tions to group banking which mitigate the advantages which would be expected to bL
similar to branch banking are: 1) the difficulty of supervision and regulation, 2) greater-
'expense-of operation, and 3) the opportunity offered for speculation in bank stocks.
CHAPMAN AND WESTERFIELD, op. cit. supra note 8, at 16.
13. The Board is authorized "as the public interest may require", to withhold from a,
"holding company affiliate" of a member bank permission to vote its stock therein REa.
STAT. 5144 (1875), as amended, 48 STAT. 86 (1933), 49 STAT. 710 (1935), 12 U.S.C.
§ 61 (1940) ; and 48 STAT. 166 (1933), 12 U.S.C. § 337 (1940). The definition of "hold-
ing company affiliate", however, includes only companies holding a majority of the out-
standing shares of a bank, whereas control may be exercised with less than majority
-ownership. See note 32 infra. Moreover, 1) the Board's discretionary powers. become
,operative only upon the need for and request by a holding company to vote its shares;
2) shares held in a non-member bank may be voted without permission; 3) the effective
penalties operate more severely against the banks controlled than the holding company.
For these reasons, the Board remains virtually powerless to act directly against the
-parent company. See Hearings on S. 829 9-12. The problem has become further compli-
cated by the Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 ST.T. 793 (1940), 15 U. S. C. § 80a-
3 (c) (4) (1940), which exempts from its provisions holding companies which have secured
a single voting permit from the Board.
14. The Board secured the introduction of H.R. 2776 and S. 792 (anti-Sank holding
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the Board seeks to curb Transamerica indirectly by so conditioning the ad-
mission of individual banks into the Federal Reserve System as to prevent
such banks from coming under Giannini control.
In Peoples' Bank v. Eccles 11 the Board's authority to exercise such indirect
restraint on Transamerica expansion has been denied by the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia upon the questionable ground that author-
ity to restrain directly is inadequate. The facts are these. Incorporated in
1941 upon a finding by the California State Superintendent of Banks that
the "public convenience and advantage" would be thereby promoted, the
Peoples' Bank of Lakewood Village forthwith applied for membership in
the Federal Reserve System. The bank was admitted by the Board of Gover-
nors subject, not only to conditions customarily imposed upon Reserve mem-
bership,1 6 but also to a special condition-that membership would be with-
drawn upon sixty days' notice if "without prior written approval of the Board
of Governors" Transamerica Corporation or any unit, affiliate, or subsidiary
of the Transamerica group, including the Bank of America, should acquire
directly or indirectly "any interest in such bank other than such as may arise
out of usual correspondent bank relationships .... ," 17 Less than two years
after acceptance by the bank of conditioned membership, without its knowl-
edge, and consequently without prior approval of the Board, Transamerica
acquired more than 10% of its outstanding shares of capital stock."8 In-
formed that enforcement of the condition would result in deprivation of de-
posit insurance, 19 as well as Reserve membership, the bank requested its
cancellation. On the Board's refusal, the bank instituted the present suit
to have the condition declared void and its enforcement enjoined.
company bill) in March 1945, 91 CoNG. REc. 2747, 2795, A1476 (1945), which was with-
drawn after extensive opposition developed. 92 CoNG. R c. A2389 (1946). Substituted
therefor was H.R. 6225 which died in Committee. 92 CONG. Rc. 4264 (1946). On
March 6, 1947, S. 829 was introduced by Senator Tobey and is still awaiting Congres-
sional action.
15. 161 F.2d 636 (App. D.C. 1947), cert. granted, 68 Sup. Ct. 55 (Oct. 13, 1947).
16. Id. at 638. By these conditions, the bank is required to conduct its business
"with due regard to the safety of its depositors", to seek Board approval of any chango in
the character of its business or in the scope of its corporate powers, to maintain adequate
capital and surplus funds in relation to its assets and deposit liabilities, and to accede to
restrictions on real estate loans.
17. Ibid.
18. As of December 31, 1946, Transamerica still held 540 shares in the Peoples' Bank
of 5000 outstanding. MooDy's 870; STANDAiD & PooR's T-Z 4728. On June 30, 1947,
it was announced that Samuel B. Stewart, Jr., on the brief for the Peoples' Bank, had
been appointed vice-president and general counsel of the Bank of America. STANDARD
& Poo 's A-B 65-6 (Guide and Index Section, Oct.-Nov., 1947).
19. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation appears to have indicated "its un-
willingness under existing circumstances to insure any newly organized State non-member
bank in which Transamerica Corporation has a substantial interest or any bank in the
group which may withdraw from the Federal Reserve System." Brief for Appellees, p.
26, Peoples' "Bank v. Eccles, 161 F.2d 636 (App. D.C. 1947).
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Reversing the lower court which had sustained a defense that the bank,
having accepted Reserve membership, was estopped to question the validity
of the condition, 20 the Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, held that the
condition as imposed "to prevent the enlargement of Transamerica" 21 was
beyond the statutory power of the Board. In place of the original condition,
the court substituted a judicial version requiring, before forfeiture could be-
come effective, a finding that "a change for the worse" has occurred in the
"character of the bank's personnel [or] in its banking policies" 22 jeopardiz-
ing the safety of its depositors.
Confronted with this decision and still desirous of curbing Transamerica,
the Board had two alternatives. On the one hand, to enforce the condition
as modified by the court's mandate would require a finding of jeopardy to
depositors which the Board was presumably unprepared to make. Although
charges have been levelled at Giannini-dominated banking associations that,
for example, the ratio maintained between capital and deposits is inade-
quate2 3 or that certain bank accounting practices are irregular,2 4 there is no
suggestion in its brief that the Board regards Transamerica's banking policy
as unsound in the restricted sense adopted by the court. On the other hand,
to secure review by the Supreme Court might enlarge the limited scope of
the condition. Adopting the latter course, therefore, the Board has filed a
successful petition for certiorari. 25
Whether the Board's position will be vindicated on review will depend
upon how the Supreme Court construes Section 9 of the Federal Reserve Act
which authorizes the Board "subject to the provisions of this Act and to such
20. The decision of the lower court on this question is unreported. It had previously
held that a sufficiently justiciable controversy existed to permit the invocation of a de-
claratory judgmen. Peoples' Bank v. Eccles, 64 F. Supp. 811 (D.D.C. 1946).
21. 161 F.2d 636, 643-4 (App. D.C. 1947).
22. Ibid.
23. In a letter to A.P. Giannini by Board Chairman Eccles, March 3, 1943, the
latter suggested that the low ratio between capital funds and deposits maintained by
the Bank of America "might be considered an example of the kind of 'financial policy' re-
ferred to in recent correspondence and discussions" as unsound. Joint Appendix, pp.
90, 91, Peoples' Bank v. Eccles, 161 F.2d 636 (App. D.C. 1947). Compare the capital-
deposit ratio of 7.1% maintained by Chase National Bank with the 4,3% ratio main-
tained by Bank of America. Fortune, July, 1947, p. 172. For the similar problem fac-
ing all banks, however, see the alarm broadcast by Chairman Hanrl of the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation: "The ratio of capital to deposits [in all federally insured
banks] had shrunk from 25% in 1914 to 11% in 1940, and is only about 6% today" de-
spite the fact that in 1945 insured banks retained 70% of their profits in the capital ac-
count. Commercial & Finance Chronicle, May 16, 1946, p. 2690, cols. 4-5.
24. This charge formed a partial basis of the proceedings instituted against Trans-
america in 1938 by the Securities and Exchange Commission and dismissed in 1947 after
extensive hearings. See Bank of America, N.T. & S. Ass'n v. Douglas, 105 F2d 100,
102-3 (App. D. C. 1939); Saturday Evening Post, Oct. 4, 1947, p. 128; DA.;, op. cii.
.rupra note 1, at 291-310; cf. Transamerica Corporation, 10 S.E.C. 454 (1941).
25. 68 Sup. Ct 55 (Oct. 13, 1947).
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conditions as it may prescribe Pursuant thereto" to admit an applying bank
to Reserve membership.28 The Court of Appeals, consulting the legislative
history of Section 9, found that Congress, "quite deliberately and because
of what it considered an abuse of power," 27 inserted the words "pursuant
thereto" as a substantial restriction on the power of the Board.2" Turning
then to repeated assertions by the Board in its pending appeal for Congres-
sional action that it lacks the direct authority needed to control bank hold-
ing company expansion," the court concluded that the condition in its orig-
inal form is not "pursuant to the legislative intent in adopting the Act." 1,
But from the mere circumstance that the Board is unable to vindicate
its banking policy by direct action against Transamerica, it does not follow
that the Board is precluded from prescribing otherwise valid conditions of
Reserve membership. Since in passing initially upon membership applica-
tions and deposit insurance eligibility, the Board is required by the Act itself
to consider, inter alia, not only "the financial condition of the applying
bank," but also "the general character of its management," 31 it should be
26. 40 STAT. 233 (1917), as amended, 44 STAr. 1229 (1927), 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1940)
(italics added).
27. 161 F.2d 636, 641 (App. D.C. 1947).
28. Before amendment in 1927, § 9 read: "The Federal Reserve Board subject to
such condtions as it may prescribe may permit the applying bank to become" a Re-
server member. 40 STAT. 233 (1917) (italics added). There can be no doubt that, by
the 1927 amendment, Congress did intend to restrict the power of the Reserve Board.
But there is no evidence that Congress was concerned with the Board's power over
bank holding companies, and the court did not purport to place its decision on this
ground. The purpose of the amendment appears to have been twofold: 1) to remedy
an obvious and inadvertent defect in the original act which had omitted to provide any
limitation on the Board's discretion, Hearings on S. 1782 125; 66 CONG. RMC. 4413 (1925) ;
68 CONG. REc. 3953 (1927) ; and 2) to prevent the Board from continuing in effect certain
of its branch banking regulations which were inconsistent with provisions of the Mc-
Fadden Act, 44 STAT. 1228-9 (1927), of which the amendment was a part. See Hearings
on S. 1782 297; 66 CoNG. REc. 1463-74 (1925). Compare the more restrictive amendments
considered and rejected. Id. at 1779, 1819; 67 CONG. REC. 3241, 3249 (1926) ; Hearings on
S. 1782 20.
29. Testimony of Marriner S. Eccles, Chairman of the Board of Governors in Hear-
ings before the Committee on Banking and Currency on H.R. 1699, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.
132-3 (1943) ; Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency on H.R. 2634, 78th
Cong., 1st Sess. 13-5, 20-1 (1943); 30 REP. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF TUE FEDERAL RE-
sERv Sysr=x 34-7 (1943). Compare the testimony of Board Vice Chairman Ronald
Ransom and Board Counsel J. Leonard Townsend in Hearings before Subeomnmtite of
House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 2357 (to amend the Clayton Act) 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. 336-40 (1945).
30. 161 F.2d 636, 641 (App. D.C. 1947).
31. 40 STAT. 233 (1917), 12 U.S.C. § 322 (1940) (membership applications); 48
STAT. 169 (1933), as amended, 49 STAT. 688 (1935), 12 U.S.C. §264(g) (1940) (de-
posit insurance eligibility). The Board is required to consider, in addition, "the ad-
equacy of its capital structure, its future earnings prospects, . . .the convenience and
needs of the community to be served by the bank, and whether or not its corporate powers
are consistent with the purposes of this section." Ibid.
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clearly empowered so to condition membership as to prevent the subsequent
impairment of either. And the court recognized that a restriction of the type
imposed by the Board is "pursuant" to the provisions of the Act 3 2 by itself
substituting an emasculated version of the membership condition.
The real difficulty is that the Act fails to lay down any precise standards
for determining when the "management" or "financial condition" of an ap-
plying bank is unsatisfactory.
The court chose the narrow criterion of the safety of the bank's own de-
positors; but there is a broader policy which the Federal Reserve Act was
designed to effectuate. A reading of the Act and its history indicates that
its primary purpose is to strengthen the national economy as a whole by the
maintenance of a sound banking system.33 The Board could reasonably
32. If the premise is accepted that ownership of a majority of its shares is not
necessary to obtain effective control of a company, (see Northern American Co. Y.
SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 693 (1946)), the restriction placed on the admission of the Peoples'
Bank is directly related to its management and indirectly to its financial condition.
33. Except in its preamble ("An Act to provide for the establishment of Federal
reserve banks, to furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting commer-
cial paper, to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United States, and
for other purposes"), the objectives of the Federal Reserve Act are not articulated.
Congress -as, in fact, requested by Board Chairman Eccles to incorporate a more general
statement of policy, but the request has been unanswered to date. See Hearings before
Committee on Banking and Currency on H.R. 5357, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 251 (1935).
Even as originally conceived, however, the Act, designed to remedy serious defects
in the banking system responsible for a series of national financial panics, was directly
concerned with the stabilization of the economy and only indirectly with the protection
of individual bank depositors; see RF. NATIONAL MoxLrARa Co!un~ssion 6-9 (1912)
(enumerating deficiencies in the banking system prior to the establishment of the Federal
Reserve Board); H.R. REP. No. 69, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-30 (1913); Buncmss, TuE
REsERvE BANKS AND THL Moxny M uRKr c. 18 (Rev. ed. 1946); Willis, Federal Re-
serve System in 6 ENcyc. Soc. Sc. 154 (1931) ; while the Reserve Board the Act es-
tablished was intended to insure "a banking policy which shall be uniform and harmoni-
ous for the country as a whole." H.R. RF'. No. 69, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1913).
And an examination of its provisions, as amended, makes even more clear the responsi-
bilities entrusted to the Board of Governors in the effectuation of broad economic policy.
Thus, for example: Regulations governing open-market operations are to be adopted by
the Board and representatives of the Reserve Banks "%ith a view to accommodating
commerce and business and with regard to their bearing upon the general credit situa-
tion of the country.' 48 STAT. 168 (1933), as amended, 49 SrAT. 705 (1935), 12 U.S.C.
§263 (1940), 56 STAT. 647 (1942), 12 U.S.C. §263 (Supp. 1946). Federal Reserve
Banks, subject "to the orders of the Board of Governors .. "' may extend to member
banks "such discounts, advancements, and accommodations as may be safely and reason-
ably made with due regard for the claims and demands of other member banks, the
maintenance of sound credit conditions, and the accommodation of commerce, industry
and agriculture," 38 STAT. 254 (1913), as amended, 48 STAT. 163 (1933), 49 STAT. 704
(1935), 12 U.S.C. §301 (1940), and may engage in purchase and sale of acceptances on
the open market "whenever the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System shall
declare that the public interest so requires." 38 STAT. 264 (1913), as amended, 42 STAT.
1480 (1923), 12 U.S.C. § 359 (1940). See also 38 STAT. 261 (1913), as amended, 49
1947]
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conclude that the achievement of this objective 14 requires: 1) the pres-
ervation of independent member banks to minimize the possibilities of
fiscal paralysis from the economic misfortunes of a single organization,35
and 2) the separation of private banking control from the management of
other corporate enterprises to insure that credit will be extended on an im-
partial basis to all members of the borrowing public." It follows that the'
anticipated attempt of Transamerica to secure an interest in the Peoples'
STAT. 704 (1935), 12 U.S.C. §248(m) (1940); 38 STAT. 264 (1913), as amended, 49
STAT. 706 (1935), 12 U.S.C. §357 (1940); 48 STAT. 54 (1933), as amended, 56 STAT.
S9(9. 706 (1935), 12 U.S.C. §357 (1940); 48 STAT. 54 (1933), as amended, 56 STAT.
704 (1935), 12 U.S.C. § 241 (1940). For a judicial summary of the Board's responsibil-
ities see Raichle v. Federal Reserve Bank, 34 F.2d 910, 912 (C.C.A. 2d 1931). For dis-
cussion by a member of the staff of the Board of Governors, see Goldenweiser, Insfru-
ments of Federal Reserve Policy in BANKING STUDIES 389 (1941).
34. It is quite possible that measures taken by the Board, conducive to the mainte-
nance of a sound banking system as a whole, will be inconsistent with the best interests
of an individual bank's depositors. "For example, an individual bank is generally re-
garded as having strengthened its position if, at the first sign of weakness or impending
weakness in prices or values, it sells bonds and calls loans. If such a policy, however,
is followed by many banks at the same time, either on their own volition or because of
supervisory action, it may cause such a decline in values as to weaken the system as a
whole ... ." Leonard, Supervision of the Commercial Banking System in BANKING
STUDIES 189, 192 (1941).
35. See Hearings on S. 829 27; SEN'. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 294
(1934) ; 66 CONG. REc. 4437 (1925); cf. Brief for Appellees, pp. 36-7, Peoples' Bank
v. Eccles, 161 F.2d 636 (App. D.C. 1947). "[Ilf the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration .. . itself had determined that Transamerica's bank expansion program was un-
sound from the standpoint of further extending the insurance liability of the United States
to that group of affiliated banks, then it seems clear that such determination was entitled
to the highest respect by the Board." Ibid. See also the remarks of Chairman Crowley
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to Secretary of the Treasury Morgen-
thau: "Here I am guaranteeing 800 million in deposits all over the country, and 400
million of that is in one bank, the Bank of America." Saturday Evening Post, Oct. 4,
1947, p. 128.
36. See Hearings on S. 829 15, 20, 24. Such a separation of control would have the
additional advantage of protecting bank depositors by insuring that loans would be ex-
tended only in the best interests of the bank. The court's mandate that a finding of jeop-
ardy to depositors precede enforcement of the membership condition might conceivably
sanction a mere finding that depositors in the Peoples' Bank are endangered by Trans-
america's dual interest in both the bank and non-banking enterprises. From a reading of
the opinion, however, it appears unlikely that the court had this problem in mind in fram-
ing the decree. Moreover, the additional requirement imposed by its mandate that the
condition's enforcement be specifically predicated upon "a change for the worse" in the
"character of the bank's personnel" "or in its banking policies" would seem to necessitate
a finding of particular instances where the extension of credit to non-banking enterprises
under Transamerica control was not in the best interests of the Peoples' Bank. In view
of the practical difficulty involved in making such a determination, the Board is forced,
therefore, to seek Supreme Court restoration of the original condition if its attempt to
curb Transamerica is to be successful.
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Bank forms a relevant consideration in evaluating the "general character of
[the bank's] management" and thus, in conditioning its Reserve membership.
By the Banking Act of 1933 a further guidepost to Congressional policy
was incorporated in the Reserve Act. Through an amendment requiring ap-
proval of the Board before a "holding company affiliate" of a member bank
may vote its stock therein,37 Congress sought for the first time to apply di-
rect sanctions to bank holding companies. Although the inadequacy of the
statute since its adoption to accomplish the purpose for which it was de-
signed 31 has led the Board to seek its amendrnent, ' it remains, nevertheless,
a positive expression of Congressional policy diametrically opposed to the
unfettered expansion of holding company control over "the affairs" of indi-
vidual banking institutions. Here, then, is another standard against which
the "character of management" of the Peoples' Bank should be judged.
Furthermore, it is arguable that the Board should be permitted to look
beyond the broad policy of the Federal Reserve Act to the policy of the Clay-
ton Act whose banking provisions it is expressly required to enforce.40 Since
the Clayton Act is intended to supplement the Sherman Act by reaching "in
their incipiency" 41 combinations which "may substantially lessen competi-
37. REv. STAT. 5144 (1875), as amended, 48 STAT. 186 (1933), 49 STAT. 710 (1935),
12 U.S.C. § 61 (1940) (amendment to National Banking Act applicable to National
Banks); 48 STAT. 166 (1933), 12 U.S.C. § 337 (1940) (amendment to Federal Reserve
Act applicable to State member banks). The amendment %as adopted after an extensive
study and investigation of "group, chain, and branch banking", Hearings before House
Committee on Banking mid Currency tuder H. Res. 141, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930), fol-
lowed by a favorable report from the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Szn:.
REP. No. 584, pt. 1, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-11 (1932). Holding company control of mem-
ber banks was strongly condemned as "a perversion of national banking and state banking
laws... which tends toward danger in several directions." Id. at 9. Since, in the opin-
ion of the Senate Committee, bank holding companies had "in some parts of the United
States become well rooted.. ." with resulting difficulty in "eliminating or abolishing
them in any effective way", it was "thought best to attempt the control and oversight of
these companies" through controlling the conditions under which their stocks could be
voted. Id. at 10.
38. See note 13 mipra.
39. See note 14 supra.
40. 38 STAT. 734 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1940). Thus, the Board, after hearing, may
issue "cease and desist" orders against persons or banking associations violating the pro-
visions of Clayton Act §§ 2, 3, 7, 8 (15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 18, 19). Of particular importance
are § 7 (prohibiting the acquisition by one corporation of the stock of a competing corpora-
tion or of corporations competing with each other whose effect may be substantially to lessen
competition, to restrain commerce, or to create monopoly) and § 8 (prohibiting certain inter-
locking directorates between competing banks).
Another policy which might appropriately guide the Board in its duties under the
Reserve Act is expressed in the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 directing the Board
to establish margin requirements for trading in securities registered on national securities
exchanges. 48 STAT. 886 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78(g) (1940).
41. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 356 (1922); ci.
Fashion Originators Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
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tion or tend to create monopoly," 42 the Board, in evaluating the "character
of management" of the Peoples' Bank, should not be precluded from weigh-
ing the possibility that Transamerica's influence upon that management may
contribute to monopolistic tendencies in banking. 43 The Board has indicated
fairly clearly its opinion that such a possibility is real, 44 and the factual foun-
dations for its opinion do not appear wholly without merit. 45 On the one
42. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1940) (italics added). Moreover, the Fed-
eral Reserve Act itself, passed by the same Congress which enacted the Clayton Act,
implicitly contemplates a competitive banking system. See H.R. REP. No. 69, 63d Cong.,
1st Sess. 18 (1913). In drafting the bill, the Committee on Banking and Currency aban-
doned "all thought of attempting a plan of banking reform based upon the conception of
large privately managed institutions operating unrestrictedly and with great numbers of
branches." Id. at 13. Compare the description of the Federal Reserve System by Presi-
dent Woodrow Wilson shortly after it had received executive approval, quoted in Hear-
ings before Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 1715 and H.R. 7617, 72d Cong.,
2d Sess. 262, 291 (1934). It does not follow, of course, that the location, of competing
banks within the same community is always possible or desirable. Cf. amendment to the
Reserve Act, 49 STAT. 688 (1935), 12 U.S.C. §264(g) (1940), whose limited effect on
the competitive banking system is discussed in Hearings on S. 1715 and H.R. 7617, supra,
at 143-5, 181-5, and Wyatt, Federal Banking Legislation in BANKrINo STUDIES 39, 60
(1941). Nor does it follow that even where independent banks coexist within the same
community that the competition between them should be entirely unrestrained. Cf.
Chandler, Monopolistic Elements in Commercial Banking, 46 J. POL. EcoN, 1(1938). To
the extent that monopoly is permitted to grow, however, one of the premises upon which
are predicated the credit policies entrusted to the Board is undermined. Id. at 21.
43. Cf. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.190 (1944), where the
Supreme Court sustained FCC regulations, designed to insure competitive conditions in
the broadcasting industry, imposed upon radio networks applying for a license. The
regulations were held to be within the broad authority of the Commission to act "in the
public interest" although "the Act does not explicitly say that the Commission shall have
power to deal with network practices found inimical to the public interest." Id. at 219.
The Court indicated, moreover, that "the public interest" comprehends the purposes tile
anti-trust acts are designed to achieve despite the absence of Congressional authorization to
the Commission to enforce either the Sherman or Clayton Acts and regardless of whether
the monopolistic practices sought to be regulated were contrary to their express provisions.
Compare the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas in McLean Trucking Co. v.
United States, 321 U.S. 67, 86 (1944), where he urges that despite tile express exemption
from the requirements of the anti-trust laws conferred upon participants in consolidations
approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission, "administrative authority to replace
the competitive system with a cartel should be strictly construed. . . . Since the 'public
interest' includes the principles of free enterprise, which have long distinguished our econ-
omy, I can hardly believe that Congress intended them [the anti-trust laws] to be swept
aside." Id. at 93-4.
44. Brief for Appellees, pp. 5-6, 26-8, 41-3, Peoples' Bank v. Eccles, 161 F.2d 636
(App. D.C. 1947). The Board, of course, does not propose to exact forfeiture of Reserve
membership without the advance notice, hearing, and findings prescribed in 46 STAT. 250,
251 (1913), 12 U.S.C. §327 (1940). Id. at 6.
45. Whether the instant acquisition by Transamerica of shares in the Peoples' Bank
may be construed to violate § 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 732 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1940), is not capable of satisfactory determination upon the available facts. Moreover,
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hand, banking associations competing with those in the Transamerica group
are being progressively absorbed or eliminated." On the other hand, non-
banking enterprises under Transamerica control occupy a preferred position
over their competitors in obtaining access to its credit facilities.4
It is questionable, therefore, whether the instant decision substantially
limiting the power of the Board to condition Reserve membership can be
justified by the Federal Reserve Act. There would seem to be no Congres-
sional intention manifest in the express language of Section 9 to confine the
Board's discretion in passing upon Reserve applicants to considerations af-
fecting only the depositors of an individual bank or even depositors as a class.
On the contrary, wherever Congress has affirmatively indicated the objec-
tives of the Reserve System, it has emphasized that the Board must consider
the needs of the borrowing and investing public as well as those of the indi-
vidual lending institution. Reversal of the Court of Appeals' restrictive de-
cision seems in order.
no reported cases have been found to indicate the applicable extent of § 7 to banks, bank-
ing associations, or trust companies, for the excellent reason that the Board has not pur-
sued its enforcement. J. Leonard Townsend, General Counsel for the Board, explains the
hesitation of the Board to invoke Clayton Act proceedings by its conclusion that "it is
more against than in the public interest to commence such a proceeding and let the onus
fall upon the bank involved, as it would, rather than upon an acquiring corporation."
Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee on the Judiciary on HR. 2357, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. 340 (1945). The Board nevertheless wholeheartedly endorsed a proposed
amendment to § 7 which would have extended the prohibition of stock acquisitions to
include the acquisition of physical assets of competing corporations. Id. at 336.
The Board's hesitation in seeking enforcement of the Clayton Act provides a partial
explanation for the imposition of Reserve membership conditions, voluntarily assumed by
an individual applying bank, in an unsuccessful attempt to achieve a similar result without
the undesirable consequences conceived by the Board to follow from Clayton Act enforce-
ment. But ef. Brief for Appellees, pp. 45-6, Peoples' Bank v. Eccles, 161 F.2d 636 (App.
D.C. 1947). It is not clear, however, in what way the onus of Clayton Act enforcement
would fall upon an individual bank, since under 38 SrxT. 734 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 21
(1940), the Board could simply require Transamerica to divest itself of the shares held in
the Peoples' Bank.
46. See pp. 297-8 supra. See also Hearings on S. 829 22, 24, 26, 39; Hcarings before
Committee on Banking and Currency on H.R. 2634, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-5, 20-1
(1943) ; cf. Hearings before Subcommittee of Conmittee on thme Judiciary on H.R. 2357,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 336-40 (1945).
47. See Hearings on S. 829 22-4, 32-3, 41-2.
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INTRA-FAMILY ASSIGNMENTS AND INCOME TAXATION:
USE OF THE CORPORATE FORM AS A MEANS
OF AVOIDANCE*
In the last twenty years increasing judicial realism has frustrated a num-
ber of tax-reducing, income-splitting schemes.' One such device, the intra-
family assignment, seemed consigned to relative obscurity under the holdings
of the Horst, Eubank and Schaffner cases. 2 But a recent circuit court of ap-
peals decision, by exclusive concern with the superficial, appears to revitalize
this contrivance and also to invite further personal income tax evasion
through use of the corporate form.
In Sun-nen v. Commissioner 3 the taxpayer, an inventor-patentee, assigned
to his wife his "right, title and interest" in several licensing contracts, The
contracts granted ten-year, non-exclusive licenses to a corporation for the
manufacture and sale of items covered by his patents, in exchange for a per-
centage of the sales, and were terminable by either party-some on six
months', others on a year's notice.' Eighty-nine percent of the licensee cor-
poration's stock was owned by the taxpayer, who was one of the company's
five directors. The remaining shares were split among the other directors,
one of whom was the wife-assignee. 5 In reviewing the Tax Court's finding
* Sunnen v. Commissioner, 161 F2d 171 (C.C.A. 8th 1947).
1. Lusthaus v. Commissioner, 327 U.S. 293 (1946), Commissioner v. Tower, 327
U.S. 280 (1946) and Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136 (1932) (family partnerships);
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940) (short-term family trusts with settlor re-
taining managerial control over corpus); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); Brown
v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 337 (C.C.A. 2d 1940) (assignment of fees to wholly-owned
corporation); Jones v. Page, 102 F.2d 144 (C.C.A. 5th 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 562
(1939).
See generally Lowndes, The Tax Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1940 Tcrn, 90
U. or PA. L. Rxv. 1 (1941); Polisher, Assignment of Income --- An Ineffecti've At-
tempt to Reduce Income Taxes, 78 J. AcCOUNTAN cY 224 (1944).
2. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) (assignment of bond coupons before
maturity); Helvering v. Eubank, 311. U.S. 122 (1940) (assignment of agent's commis-
sions on renewals of insurance policies); Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941)
(assignment of trust income for one year). In each case the income was held taxable to
the assignor. See Notes 41 COL. L. Rsv. 340, 26 CORN. L. Q. 510, 39 Mxcii. L. Ra,.
495 (1941).
3. 161 F.2d 171 (C.C.A. 8th 1947).
4. For the licenses the corporation (the Sunnen Products Company) agreed to pay
10% of the gross sales price of the devices, which were used in the repair of automobiles.
161 F.2d 171, 173 (C.C.A. 8th 1947). The termination provision read: "either party
shall have the right without liability for damages or breach, to cancel this license. ..
Id. at 174.
5. Of the corporation's 2,000 outstanding shares of capital stock, the husband held
1,780. He also served as President. His wife owned 200. The vice-president held
eighteen shares, and the remaining two directors owned a single share each. 161 F.2d
171, 172 (C.C.A. 8th 1947).
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of tax liability, the circuit court conceded that if the taxpayer could abrogate
the contracts which he had assigned, the royalties were taxable to him, but
reversed on the theory that he had no such power.6 The basis for this con-
clusion was that since three of the corporation's five directors must approve
any corporate action, the taxpayer-assignor as a single director was unable to
terminate the contracts.
The power of an assignor to defeat the assignee's receipt of income is gen-
erally well established as justification for taxing the assignor! This concept
of "negative control" saw principal service in the post-Lucas era s The dis-
allowance in that case of anticipatory assignments on income as legitimate
means of reducing taxes had prompted taxpayers subsequently to character-
ize all intra-family assignments as transfers not of future income but of income-
producing property. Thus the application of'the practical concept of nega-
tive control, rationalized in terms of equivalency to income, was useful in
despatching arguments that the location of "title" to the source of income
foreclosed taxation of the transferor.9
6. In its unanimous opinion, 6 T.C. 431 (1945), the Tax Court had relied heavily on
its decision in Estate of J.G. Dodson, 1 T.C. 416 (1943). Dodson licensed a corpora-
tion in which he owned 51% of the stock for the exclusive use of a trda mark owned
by him. His wife owned 49% of the stock, and he assigned to her one-half interest in
the contract. There was one other director. The Tax Court ruled that his dominant
stock position permitted him to cancel the licenses and thus rendered him taxable on the
income flowing from his wife's "interest." The circuit court plainly considers the Dod-
son decision erroneous. 161 F.2d 171, 174, 176 (C.C.A. 8th 1947).
Both the Tax Court and the circuit court are interpreting a Congressional statute
which sheds no light on the specific problem at hand. It reads: "'Gross income' in-
cludes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for
personal service.., of whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions,
vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether real or
personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in such property; also
from interest, rent, dividends, securities or the transaction of any business carried on
for gain or profit or for gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever.
... " l x. REv. CODE § 22(a). The taxable years involved were covered by a statute em-
ploying identical language. Revenue Act of 1936, § 22, 49 STAT. 1648 (1936). The ap-
plicable Treasury Regulation is no more helpful. U.S. Treas. Reg. 101, § 22(a) (1938).
7. 2 M zrzs, LAw oF FEDESAL Ixcom TAXATzoNr § 18.02. (1942); Note, 31 i..
L. Ry.v 271 (1936).
This power is seldom a major factor in the ordinary income tax case involving the
assignment of licensing contracts because the licensor rarely has any interest in the
manufacturing licensee. Nelson v. Ferguson, 56 F2d 121 (C.C.A. 3d 1932), cert. deicd
286 U.S. 565 (1932); J.E. Lilienfeld, 35 B.T.A. 391 (1937); Ralph K. Lovejoy, B.T.A.
Mzm. Op. DKT. No. 93197 (April 28, 1939). Estate of J.G. Dodson, 1 T.C. 416
(1943) is the lone exception. See note 6 supra.
8. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930), 43 HARv. L. Rnv. 1282, 8 Tnx. L. Rsv. 610.
9. Rossmoore v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 520 (C.C.A. 2d 1935) (wife's interest in
partnership ignored as the tax determinant); Ward v. Commissioner, 58 F2d 757, 760
(C.C.A. 9th 1932) (". . . decedent was free to transfer'the lease itself, thereby depriv-
ing himself of the right to receive future rentals and rendering the assignments to
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While professing full adherence to this concept, the court in the instant
case sapped it of considerable vitality by failing to recognize basic powers
of the assignor. It overlooked the significance of the assignor's continuing
status as patent owner and the non-exclusive nature of the licenses.1" These
two facts enable the assignor to license other firms and thereby possibly to
cut off some of his wife's royalties. 1 Reduction of the royalties might also
be accomplished by his refusal to prosecute patent infringements.
1 2
More unfortunate is the court's reasoning that the assignor cannot effect
petitioners valueless . . ."); Chicago Title and Trust Co., 33 B.T.A. 65 (1935) (right
to attorney's fees); T.J. Primm, 28 B.T.A. 13 (1933).
Instead of branding the barren "title" argument as irrelevant, the court in the prin-
cipal case devoted considerable space to this sophistic type of reasoning. See L. Hand,
J., dissenting in In re Lake's Laundry, 79 F.2d 326, 328 (C.C.A. 2d 1935). Its par-
ticipation in the chicken-and-egg argument as to whether the patents, retained by the
taxpayer, or the contracts, held by his wife were the source of royalties is unfortunate
since the precedent which the court summons is very weak. Of the seven cases
cited as establishing that the contracts were the source, six do not pertain to royal-
ties and patents. Commissioner v. O'Donnell, 90 F.2d 907 (C.C.A. 9th 1937), r'ctd
on other grounds, 303 U.S. 370 (1938); Shanly v. Bowers, 81 F.2d 13 (C.C.A.
2d 1936) (legatee conveyed legacy to a trust company as trustee for wife) ; Helvering
v. Seatree, 72 F.2d 67 (App. D.C. 1934) (interest in profits of a partnership) ; Lowery
v. Helvering, 70 F.2d 713 (C.C.A. 2d 1934) (income from legacy under a will); Hall
v. Burnet, 54 F.2d 443 (App. D.C. 1931), ccrt. denied, 285 U.S. 552 (1932) (right to
commissions on insurance premiums) ; Commissioner v. Field, 42 F.2d 820 (C.C.A. 2d
1930) (assignment of part of amount due under will).
The lone cited case which does involve patents and royalties is not in point because
there the contract assignor had previously assigned the patents to the manufacturer;
whereas here he retained ownership of them. Nelson v. Ferguson, 56 F.2d 121 (C.C.A.
3d 1932), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 565 (1933).
In Lilienfeld v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 391 (1937), which the Sunnen court does
not cite, it was held that the assigned licensing contract was the sole source of the royal-
ties, but there the Board had treated the exclusive licensing arrangement as an assign-
ment of the patents to the manufacturing licensee.
Two other decisions assume the circuit court's contention expressly for the sake of
argument and then proceed to an opposite conclusion-i.e., taxation of the assignor.
Washington v. Commissioner, 80 F.2d 829 (C.C.A. 2d 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S.
689 (1936) (power to defeat the assignees' income by express reservation); Estate of
J.G. Dodson, 1 T.C. 416 (1943). See note 6'supra.
10. The court does not even mention the fact that these are non-exclusive licenses.
For a description of the various types of licenses see 2 WALy, oN PATtNTS §§ 366-80
(Deller's ed. 1937).
11. The likelihood that a reduction of his wife's royalties would result from addi-
tional licenses destroys the court's analogy to land rentals. The court argues that the
royalties were no more under the assignor's control after assignment of the contract than
would be the rentals after an assignment of a realty lease. 161 F.2d 171, 175 (CC.A.
8th 1947). But the difference between a lease of realty and a non-exclusive license is
considerable since ordinarily the assignor of the former could not diminish its value.
12. Nor could the Sunnen corporation, itself, successfully institute an infringement
suit, for a non-exclusive licensee cannot maintain such a suit. Contracting Division, A.C.
Horn Corp. v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 113 F.2d 864 (C.C.A. 2d 1940).
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termination of the contracts by the corporation because he has but one of
the three directors' votes necessary to sanction such action.Y3 It is unlikely
that directors with token stock holdings would defy a director with holdings
of eighty-nine per cent.14 And even if such defiance did occur, the assignor's
frustration would last only until the next annual shareholders' meeting when
he could replace the recalcitrants with more pliable directors.15 Because of
this control the assignor could also determine the corporation's production
and sales policies. Since no minimum royalties are specified and since the
corporation produces mechanical devices other than those covered by the
contracts,1 petitioner might even stop all his wife's income, without cancel-
ing the contracts, by simply ceasing to manufacture the particular patented
objects.
Nor does the wife appear able to forestall termination of the contracts as
long as the required notice is given her. As assignee she is a party to agree-
ments expressly terminable by the other party without liability. As a minor-
ity stockholder, she could seek enforced continuation of the contracts on the
ground that cancellation would be a wrong to the corporation. 7 Such a
claim, however, would fall apart upon the inevitable showing that the as-
signor and the corporation were prepared to enter into a new arrangement
on terms more favorable to the corporation-on an exclusive licensing ba-
sis.' 8 In fact, the only untrammelled right which the wife appears to have
is the dubious one of terminating the contracts. 9
13. "A majority stockholder in a corporation neither owns nor directly controls the
contracts or assets of the corporation. The only legitimate thing the corporation could
do in this case to destroy the income from royalties would be to exercise its reserved
right to cancel the contracts upon notice, as provided in each contract. On that proposi-
tion Sunnen could vote as one member of the board of five directors only." 161 F2d
171, 176 (C.C.A. 8th 1947).
14. Federal statutes embody just such skepticism. Investment Company Act, 54
STAT. 789, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1940) (presumption that company having tw.enty-five
percent of the voting stock of another company has controlling influence in the latter) ;
Public Utility Act, 49 STAT. 803 §2(a) 7 (1935), 15 U.S.C. §79b (1940) ("holding
company" defined as one which directly or indirectly controls ten percent of the voting
shares of a public utility company).
For description of British law on the subject see Comment, 55 YAL& L. J. 1383
(1947).
15. Transcript of Record, pp. 31-2, Sunnen v. Commissioner, 161 F2d 171 (C.C.A.
8th 1947).
16. Id. at 33-4, 36-7, 39-41.
17. Of course there is some doubt that equity would take jurisdiction in a family
situation such as this. See Sockstrom v. Commissioner, 148 F2d 491, 495-6 (C.C.A. 8th
1945); White v. Higgins, 116 F2d 312, 320 (C.C.A. 1st 1940).
18. Or the assignor might agree to royalties of only 5% as compared with the present
figure of 10%. The arrangement would mean only that the "lost" royalties would appear
as dividends, and the assignor with 89% of the stock would receive only 5.5% less total
income than he would receive if he were being paid royalties of 105.
19. In the light of all these facts, the Stamen opinion seems in error when it dis-
tinguishes the case of Dickey v. Burnet, 56 F2d 917 (C.C.A. 8th 1932), cert. dcnicd, 237
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The decision also is unorthodox in the light of doctrines developed in
related tax fields. Thus the entire earnings of a family partnership are at-
tributable to the husband if cessation of his efforts would eliminate those
earnings. 20 Various trust concepts, furthermore, are equally applicable. The
settlor who can change the trust beneficiaries has been held taxable on the
trust income even if he himself cannot become a beneficiary. 2 More strik-
ing is the analogy to a revocable trust, for in the present case the transferor
could not only cut off his wife's royalties but could also channel them to
himself by termination of the contracts.22 And if the assignor were prevented
U.S. 606 (1932) on the theory that in that case the assignor could'veto the assignee's
right to income, whereas in the instant case he could not. In the Dickey case the
taxpayer sold to a corporation, controlled by himself, a tract of clay-producing land. In
return the corporation agreed to pay two-thirds of the gross income from the land to the
taxpayer's wife and children. The income from the land was derived from a contract
between Dickey and the corporation specifying a set price per ton of clay; this contract
was subject to alteration or termination at the will of the parties. The only significant
difference between the two cases is that notice was required in the Sunncn case. The
fact that Dickey's wife and children were beneficiaries and not assignees of the contract
is of no consequence. They as well as Mrs. Sunnen could sue if the corporations failed
to pay the royalties as agreed. But obviously such failure would occur only at the
instigation of the husbands, who had the legal weapons at hand to effect the same result.
The court's finding of "no control" may run into another difficulty-the "rule" in
Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943), that the Tax Court's findings are to be
accorded the status of those of administrative agencies. As the circuit court rendering
the Sunneai opinion expressed it in an earlier case: ". . . [Where] fair-minded men may
honestly draw different conclusions ... the conclusion reached by the Tax Court is
binding." Doll v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 239, 247 (C.C.A. 8th 1945). In other words,
this court's contention appears to be that no fair-minded person could conclude that
Sunnen had control of the policies of the Sunnen Products Company.
For evaluation of the "rule" in Dobson v. Commissioner, supra, see Paul, Dobson v.
Commissioner: The Strange Ways Of Law And Fact, 57 HAav. L. Rav. 7S3 (1944);
Note, 29 CoRer. L. Q. 515 (1944).
20. Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136 (1932) ; Rossmoore v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d
520 (C.C.A. 2d 1935). In the latter case, L. Hand, J. held the Burnet case
to be controlling: "Nothing turned upon the form of the transfer, and everything upon
the fact that the assignor remained in control of the income since it was only through
his continued efforts that it could be earned ... any future earnings which he can
assign are conditional upon his continued efforts and remain in that sense at his dis-
position. That is the critical factor; the legal scaffolding is of no consequence.
Id. at 521.
21. Commissioner v. Buck, 120 F.2d 775, 777 (C.C.A. 2d 1941) ("when there is
. the power freely to sprinkle the income about among any beneficiaries he may
select (as if he were playing a hose) . . . ," the settlor may be taxed on the trust in-
come).
The newest Treasury rulings likewise would attribute to the settlor trust income
which he can shunt to others at will by switching beneficiaries. This holds true regard-
less of the duration of the trust or of the absence of other controls. T.D. 5488 1' CuM.
BumL. 19 (1946), as amended by T.D. 5567, 1947 I-NT. Rnv. BULL. No. 14 at 2 (1947).
22. Such a situation apparently would have overcome the qualms felt by some
judges in the 1930's when they were invoking the principle of negative control. In Har-
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from cancelling a contract for the two years requisite for displacement of
recalcitrant directors and notice of termination,23 that figure would still be
well within the sLx-year limit set out in the Clifford case.2 Furthermore,
irrespective of any powers of the assignor, the ten-year life of the licenses is
but a single day beyond the duration of the "short-term" trust, the income
of which is automatically taxable to the settlor under current Treasury Regu-
lations. 25
wood v. Eaton, 68 F.2d 12, 14 (C.C.A. 2d 1933) L. Hand, J. confessed,"... I have some
difficulty in thinking of the income as remaining within the assignor's control, merely
because he can defeat payment by defaulting; but I accept that explanation... ." In the
Lucas-type situation, rationalization is difficult since in defeating his ,ife's income he
must cut off his own. But here elimination of his wife's income may mean appropria-
tion of the same to himself.
The two-year maximum results from the year's duration between meetings of the
Board of Directors and the requirement of a year's notice for termination of the con-
tracts. Income from a revocable trust is always taxed to the settlor under specific
statutory mandate. The constitutionality of the original act (Revenue Act of 1924,
43 STAT. 253, 277 (1924)) was upheld in Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930),
the rationale of which appears equally appropriate to the instant case. "The income
that is subject to a man's unfettered command and that he is free to enjoy at his own
option may be taxed to him as his income whether he sees fit to enjoy it or not. . !'
Id. at 378. See 42 HAnv. L. Rav. 958 (1929), 15 Mim. L. Ray. 129 (1930), 78 U. o7
PA. L. REv. 440 (1929).
The statute involved in the Corliss case embraced trusts revocable within the "tax-
able year", and in Langley v. Commissioner, 61 F.2d 796 (C.C.A. 2d 1932), a circuit
court upheld a taxpayer daiming immunity because he reserved the right to revoke one
year and one day after the notice is given. A statutory amendment ruled out this
dodge. The applicable part of the present provision reads: "Where at any time the
power to revest in the grantor title to any part of the corpus of the trust is vested-
(1) in the grantor alone or in conjunction with any person not having a substantial ad-
verse interest in the disposition of such part of the corpus or interest therefrom.. 2" 53
STAT. 68 (1939), 26 U.S.C. § 166 (1940).
23. This period of temporary frustration for the assignor would be only one year
and a half in some instances, since some of the contracts were terminable on six months'
notice.
24. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940), 38 Micr. L. REV. 835, 49 Y".z
UJ. 1305. It is true that the short duration of the trusts was not the only reason for
taxing the settlor on the trust income. Additional factors were the intra-family nature
of the arrangement and the managerial powers which the settlor retained over the corpus.
This latter element has its counterpart in the instant case-Sunnen's control over the
manufacturing and 'sales policies of the licensee. See p. 311 supra. For the comple-
mentary nature of the three criteria in the Clifford case, see L. Hand, J. in Helvering v.
Elias, 122 F.2d 171, 173 (C.C.A. 2d 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 692 (1941).
25. Under T.D. 5488, 1 Cum. BuL. 19 (1946), as amended by T.D. 5567, 1947
Ir. Ray. BuL. No. 14 at 2 (1947), the income from any trust established for less than
ten years is taxable to the settlor. Trusts with lives ranging from ten to fifteen years
find the settlor taxed if he retains certain administrative powers. If a trust is for
longer than fifteen years, the settlor is immune unless he is able to determine the bene-
ficiaries, which power always warrants imposition of tax liability. For strong disapproval
of this Treasury Department "legislation" see Pavenstedt, The Trcasury Legislates: The
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Not only is the holding at odds with these standards of taxability---i.e.,
negative control and revocable trust,2 5 -but it suggests a new method of
income deflection not confined to the field of royalty contracts. A husband
who controlled a corporation could secure a contract between the corpora-
tion and his wife for the use of some of the wife's property on terms unfavor-
able to the corporation." In the Sunnen case the specified percentage of
sales appears normal, but if the royalties had been excessively high, some of
the husband's dividend income would have been diverted to his wife. This
device would find favor only with prosperous corporations, but it could be
employed wherever the wife held property used by the corporation under a
terminable arrangement. The mere existence of dummy directors would le-
gitimize the arrangement.2 8
Perhaps the logical answer to this, as to most problems of family income,
lies in Congressional enactment of statutes requiring compulsory joint re-
turns or per capita allocation of total family earnings.29 Meanwhile the only
Distortion of the Clifford Rule, 2 TAX L. REv. 7 (1946); but see PAUL, TAXATION FOR
PROSPERITY 299 (1947).
26. Another possible rationale for taxing the assignor would be grounded on the
"earner" theory. Luas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114 (1930) ("there is no doubt that the
statute could tax salaries to those who earned them . . .") ; Lusthaus v. Commissioner,
327 U.S. 293 (1946) ; Saenger v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 631, 632 (C.C.A. 5th 1934) ("it
is an expression of the simple truth that earned incomes are taxed to and must be paid by
those who earn them. . . .") ; Robert E. Werner, 7 T.C. 39 (1946).
Ordinarily this theory would be inapplicable since royalties on a percentage basis
stem from both the prior efforts of an inventor-patentee and the manufacturing and sales
activities of the licensee. But here it is possible to claim that the assignor's power to
set corporate policy makes the licensee's efforts synonymous with those of the assignor.
Of course invocation of this rationale would entail far more frequent taxation of assign-
ors than is the case today.
27. This seems to have been the essence of the scheme in Dickey v. Burnet, 56
F.2d 917 (C.C.A. 8th 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 606 (1932). See note 14 supra.
28. It must be remembered that the Sunnen decision's respect for formal corpo-
rate authority diverges from recent judicial policy. Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308
U.S. 355 (1939) (corporation ignored in taxing individual who controlled it and dealt
with it); Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940); Brown v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d
337 (C.C.A. 2d 1940) (attorney fees assigned to wholly owned corporation regarded as
assignor's).
29. Attempts to secure Congressional passage of a statute requiring compulsory
joint returns failed in 1941. A Wisconsin statute of similar purpose was held un-
constitutional in Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 284 U.S. 206 (1931), but the presumption
of constitutionality now accorded federal economic legislation suggests that the present
tribunal would uphold such a Congressional Act against due process arguments.
For discussion of the per capita allocation scheme, by which all members of the
family would be taxed an equal fraction of the family's total income, see Surrey, Faii-
ily Inwome and Federal Taxation, 24 TAXES 980, 984 (1946).
Extension of the state community property laws, which the Treasury recognizes as
sanctioning income-splitting between husband and wife under Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S.
101 (1930), continues in the face of Congressional inaction. Three state legislatures
enacted such laws this year-Nebraska, Michigan and Pennsylvania-making a total
of twelve in all. N.Y. Times, August 23, 1947, p. 17.
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remedy for weakening of the surtax structure lies in the courts' realistic
application of available criteria. The Sunnen decision's distortion of the
control standard by resort to a naive conception of corporate life is clearly
incompatible with such an objective.
SECTION 18 OF THE JUDICIAL CODE: THE POWER OF
A SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGE TO REMOVE A SITTING
DISTRICT JUDGE'.
SECTION 18 of the Judicial Code 1 empowers a senior circuit judge to
assign, if the public interest requires, any circuit judge to hold a district
court.2 Whether the section authorizes no more than administrative as-
signment where district judges are unavailable, or whether public interest
in the dispatch of particular litigation may call for examination of conduct
of the trial, and, where necessary, subsequent reassignment of the case, is a
question which has heretofore remained unanswered. Senior Circuit Judge
Evans of the Seventh Circuit, however, has recently indicated, in holding
that Section 18 did not vest him with authority to designate a circuit judge
to displace a sitting district judge, that construction of the section is limited
to the former alternative.3
Arising out of the fourteen year old reorganization of the Chicago, Rock
Island & Pacific Railroad, 4 a petition was presented by secured creditor
Thus there is considerable pressure from those states not having community property
laws to secure revision of existing federal laws so as either to remove the effect of such
laws on the federal income tax or to permit all couples everywhere to split their income
for tax purposes. For comprehensive study of the entire family tax problem and pos-
sible modes of treatment see TREAsuRY DEPArmrzm r, TAx T Ar umr oF FAmx
IxcomE (1947).
* n re Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Ry., 162 F2d 605 (C.C.A. 7th 1947).
1. 36 STAT. 1087-1169 (1911), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1-450 (1940).
2. 36 STAT. 1089 (1911), 28 U.S.C. §22 (1940), as amended, 56 STAT. 1095 (1942),
28 U.S.C. §22 (Supp. 1942). The pertinent part of the section reads as follows:
' .. (a) The Chief Justice of the United States, . . . or the circuit justice of any
judicial circuit, or the senior circuit judge thereof, may, if the public interest requires,
designate and assign any circuit judge... to hold a district court within such circuit."
3. 162 F.2d 606 (C.C.A. 7th 1947).
4. The railroad petitioned on June 7, 1933, in the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, for reorganization under § 77 of the National Bankruptcy Act, 47
STAT. 1474 (1933), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1940). For a history of the voluminous
litigation that ensued, sce Continental Illinois Nat. Bank and Trust Co. v. Chicago,
MI. & Pac. Ry., 72 F.2d 443 (C.C.A. 7th 1934), aff'd, 294 U.S. 648 (1935) ; In re Chi-
cago, I. & Pac. Ry., 90 F.2d 312 (C.C.A. 7th 1937), cert. dcncd sub. nam. Bankers'
Trust Co. v. Wise, 302 U.S. 717 (1937); In re Chicago, ILI. & Pac. Ry, 90 F2d 795
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groups, who alleged that obstructionist tactics and deliberate delay by the
district judge were preventing effectuation of the plan of reorganization.6
Requesting assignment of a circuit judge to succeed the sitting district
judge, petitioners argued that the public interest called for exercise by the
senior circuit judge of the authority vested in him by Section 18 to appoint a
circuit judge to conclude the proceedings, because litigation of great public
importance was proceeding neither expeditiously nor judicially.' In denying
the petition, Judge Evans held that neither the legislative history nor
previous construction of the section seemed to warrant assumption of power
to displace a sitting district judge 7 -a conclusion he felt to be substantiated
by the adequate remedies otherwise available to litigants.
(C.C.A. 7th 1937); id. 108 F.2d 410 (C.C.A. 7th 1939); id. 110 F.2d 395 (C.C.A. 7th
1940); id. 50 F. Supp. 835 (N.D. Ill. 1943); id. 149 F.2d 529 (C.C.A. 7th 1945),
rev'd sub non. Meyer v. Fleming, 327 U.S. 161 (1946); In re Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry.,
67 F. Supp. 547 (N.D. III. 1945), aff'd sub nom. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Fleming
157 F.2d 241 (C.C.A. 7th 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 780 (1946); In re Chicago,
R.I. & Pac. Ry., 155 F.2d 889 (C.C.A. 7th 1946), rev'd per curiam sub no n. Fleming
v. Traphagen, 67 Sup. Ct. 365 (1946), rehearing denied, 67 Sup. Ct. 500 (1947); It re
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 160 F.2d 942 (C.C.A. 7th 1947); id. 160 F.2d 949 (C.C.A.
7th 1947) ; Cheston v. Igoe, 162 F.2d 257 (C.C.A. 7th 1947).
See Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 242 I.C.C. 298 (1940) (original plan of reorganiza-
tion) ; id. 257 I.C.C. 307 (1944) (modified plan of reorganization).
5. Petitioners alleged that District Judge Igoe and his appointee, Trustee Colnon,
had. "virtually announced that they consider their province to be to work for unsecured
creditors and stockholders" who were eliminated by the plan of reorganization. Petition,
p. 3. See Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 257 I.C.C. 307 (1944) (modified plan of reorganiza-
tion). Judge Igoe delayed more than ten months before approving the plan and three
months before refusing to confirm it. After the circuit court ultimately affirmed it,
In re Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 160 F.2d 942 (C.C.A. 7th 1947), the district judge then
refused to accept two nominees of the secured creditors for reorganization managers,
thereby substantially altering the plan. See Cheston v. Igoe, 162 F.2d 257, 258 (C.C.A.
7th 1947). Meanwhile, .Trustee Colnon was allegedly attempting to organize stock-
holders to oppose the plan, although under § 77(f) the court was obligated to carry it
into effect. , Petition, p. 8. See In re Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 162 F.2d 606, 614
(C.C.A. 7th 1947) (remarks of Judge Evans concerning impropriety of Trustee Colnon's
actions). Two weeks prior to Judge Evans' opinion in the instant case, the circuit
court issued a writ of mandamus directing the District Judge to eupunge his alteration
from the plan. Cheston v. Igoe, supra. Petitioners claimed that the net result of Judge
Igoe's actions was an unnecessary delay of two years. Brief for Petitioners, p. 10.
6. The principal business of a court in a railroad reorganization is to effect a re-
organization diligently. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I.
& Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 685 (1935); In re Chicago, ILI. & Pac, Ry., 72 F.2d 443,
452 (C.C.A. 7th 1934). On the basis of the district judge's statement that the court
could have no confidence in any nominees proposed by the secured creditors, petitioners
claimed that he could not henceforth pass judicially on the suitability of such nominees.
Brief for Petitioners, p. 11. Allegations that Judge Igoe had stimulated hostility be-
tween Colnon and his co-trustee were also pointed to as indicative of unjudicial adminis-
tration of the case. Brief for Petitioners, p. 12.
7. Judge Evans conceded, however, that "There are some judicial precedents which
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Although it is not clear from an analysis of the legislative history of Sec-
tion 18 how much latitude Congress intended to give a senior circuit judge
to act in the public interest," it would seem that Congressional acquiescence
seem to uphold the construction which petitioners place upon this statute. . . ." 162
F.2d 606, 612. He distinguished M. L. Sylvia, 34 F. Supp. 404 (D.C. Mass. 1940) and
Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 289 U.S. 479 (1933). See note 10 infra. But he conceded
that the action of Judge Lewis of the Tenth Circuit in substituting a judge to sit in the
place of Judge Hopkins was a holding "in favor of the petitioners." 162 F2d 605,
613. See note 11 infra.
8. The section was originally reported as merely a measure to remedy congestion
in district courts by permitting circuit judges to try cases therein. Report of Special
Joint Committee on Rezision of the Laws, H.R. Doc. No. 783, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 1,
pp. 5, 13 (1910). It also appears that a collateral purpose of the section .-as to permit
circuit judges to conclude unfinished equity cases over which they had formerly exer-
cised original jurisdiction. See Penna. Steel Co. v. New York City Ry., 221 Fed. 440,
442 (S.D. N.Y. 1915) and Note, 42 YAx L. J. 279, 282 (1932).
On the other hand, committee members explained to their respective houses that § 18
was intended to establish a flexible plan whereby any circuit judge might be assigned to
hold a district court whenever occasion therefor might arise, whether from pressure of
business, 46 CoxG. REC_ 302, 304 (1910), because of the public importance of the case
below, id. at 302, 303, id. at 2138, 4006 (1911), to further the "promotion of justice," 45
CoNG. REC. 3999 (1910), or to effect any other purpose deemed to be in the public
interest, ibid., 46 CONG. REc. 2138 (1911). See, in particular, colloquy betv.en Chair-
man Moon and Representative Parker of New Jersey, id. at 4006. See Johnson v. Man-
hattan Ry., 289 U.S. 479, 498 (1933).
Judge Evans suggests that failure of proposals to make circuit judges ex offlcio mem-
bers of district courts indicates that no broad grant of authority was intended by Con-
gress. See 162 F.2d at 613 and 46 CoNG. Rc. 303, 304 (1910), id. at 809, 1452-4, 2144-4
(1911). Though the Chairman of the Committee argued that only humiliation of district
judges would result, a provision that a circuit judge should have "throughout his cir-
cuit the powers and jurisdiction of a district judge" passed the House. Id. at 2155.
But it does not follow that these proposals were rejected as a denial of power; rather
it seems to have been felt that § 18 made such a grant unnecessary. "This amendment
... is already in, the bill and comes in as § 18." Chairman Moon of the Committee on
Revision of Laws, id. at 303. See id. at 304, 809. The clause was eventually dropped out
in conference for this reason, id. at 3998-4002. See id. at 4003-4. But see Note, 46 HARv. L.
Rrv. 503, n.4 (1933).
Strong support for the proposition that section 18's "public interest" criterion en-
compasses more than docket-clearing authority is found in the fact that all the so-called
"designation powers" in other sections of the Judicial Code but one provide for reassignment
of district judges with particular reference to judicial disability or crowded dockets, but
without references to the "public interest." These designation powers comprise the fol-
lowing sections of the Judicial Code in addition to Section 18: Judicial Code § 13, 36
STAT. 1089 (1911), 28 U.S.C. § 17 (1940) (authority for district judge to sit outside his
district); Judicial Code § 14, 36 STAT. 10S9 (1911), 28 U.S.C. § 18 (1940) (power of
judge designated under § 13) ; Judicial Code § 15, 36 STAT. 10S9 (1911), 28 U.S.C. § 19
(1940) (designation by Chief Justice of district judge to any district); judicial Code
§ 16, 36 STAT. 1089 (1911), 28 U.S.C. § 20 (1940) (new appointments of district judges
under §§ 13, 14, 15); Judicial Code § 17, 36 STAT. 10S9 (1911), 28 U.S.C. §21 (1940)
(designation of district judge in place of or in aid of another in his circuit); Judicial
Code § 19, 36 STAT. 1090 (1911), 28 U.S.C. § 23 (1940) (duties of assigned judges). See
19471
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
in subsequent judicial interpretation at least establishes that the scope of
the section encompasses more than docket-clearing authority. The assign-
ment of a circuit judge to hear a particular case, irrespective of the condi-
tion of dockets below, rapidly became an established judicial practice after
the enactment of Section 18 in 1911. In several instances, moreover, courts
have had occasion to remark that the determining factor in the exercise of
Section 18 is the presence of any condition sufficiently affecting the public
interest rather than the status of district court dockets.10 In at least one
case where a senior circuit judge did not consider conduct of a receivership
proceeding compatible with the public interest-because the sitting dis-
trict judge was not "qualified" to handle the case-a circuit judge was
also Judicial Code § 120, 36 STAT. 1132 (1911), 28 U.S.C. § 216 (1940) (authority for
district -udge to sit in the circuit court). The lone other section employing the broad
criterion of the "public interest" is section 17. It is not clear whether this section could be
employed in the same manner as petitioners seek in the instant case. Cf. McDowell v.
United States, 159 U.S. 596 (1895) ; Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118 (1891).
9. "Since the Judicial Code went into effect it has been the practice of most of the
senior circuit judges to assign themselves, as well as other circuit judges, to sit in dis-
trict courts within their circuits whenever they deemed the public interest required it,
The practice was initiated early in 1912 by the then senior circuit judge for the Second
Circuit ... In the other circuits the senior circuit judges, with a notable exception,
adopted that course of action." Van Devanter, J., in Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 289
U.S. 479, 498 (1933). The notable exception was Judge Sanborn of the Eighth Circuit,
whose successors conformed to the general practice. See id. at 498, n.10. See also
Transcript of Record, pp. 553-555, 662, Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., supra, for listings
of individual examples. It was early established that an assignment to a specified re-
ceivership suit is valid. Penna. Steel Co. v. New York City Ry., 221 Fed. 440, 443
(S.D. N.Y. 1915).
10. In particular, Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 289 U.S. 479 (1933), seems to vis-
ualize assignment of a circuit judge to a case already before a district judge.
See id. at 498. This case grew out of a collateral attack upon an order made
by Senior Circuit Judge Manton of the Second Circuit sitting as a district judge
pursuant to §18. Justice Van Devanter reviewed at length the section's history
in upholding Judge Manton's assignment of himself to a case about to be instituted
but not yet docketed. The Court affirmed in part Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 61 F.2d 934
(C.C.A. 2d 1932) which had reversed the voiding of Judge Manton's order by Judge
Woolsey in 1 F. Supp. 809 (S.D. N.Y. 1932). See American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co.
v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 1 F. Supp. 820 (S.D. N.Y. 1932) (opinion of judge
Manton sustaining validity of his order).
Justice Frankfurter, as circuit justice, appeared to assume that he possessed the
power to displace a sitting district judge, although justified only by the most extraordinary
circumstances. The M.L. Sylvia, 34 F. Supp. 404, 405 (D.C. Mass. 1940). The senior circuit
judge may make an assignment under § 18 when any conditions arise which so involve the
public interest as to require designation. United States v. Gill, 292 Fed. 136 (C.C.A. 4th
1923). But cf. Benitez v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 141 F.2d 939 (C.C.A. 1st 1944) (when a
district judge is available, it is proper for a senior circuit judge to refuse to assign a circuit
judge to hold the district court) and In re Wingert, 22 F. Supp. 483 (D.C. Md. 1938)
(error by district judge in denying affidavit of prejudice may not be corrected by designa-
tion power of § 18).
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appointed to replace him." Hearings on this action were held before a sub-
committee of the House in 1937.12 Since no legislative action was taken as a
result of these hearings, it seems reasonable to conclude that Congress con-
ceded that Section 18 contained the power which the senior circuit judge
found there.' 3 Moreover, Congressional re-enactment of the section without
substantial change in 1942 suggests legislative approval of these judicial
interpretations and practices, 14 just as the section's first reenactment in
1922 suggested approval of practices that had grown up prior thereto.15 It is
11. In 1937, the case of Holloway v. Federal Reserve Life Instrance Co. was being
tried before District Judge Hopkins of the district of Kansas, who had taken over the case
after the death of District Judge Pollock. Judge Hopkins' administration brought severe
criticism, and George E. Brammer, counsel for a party to the action, orally presented
grounds of complaint to the senior circuit judge. Communication from T. 1f. Lillard,
Kansas City, Mo., attorney for the receiver of the Federal Reserve Life Insurance Com-
pany, to attorneys for petitioners in the instant case (copy on file in Yale Law Library).
Both dilatory and unjudicial conduct prejudicial to the public interest was alleged. See
Affidavit dated April 14, 1937, reprinted Kansas City Journal-Post, July 28, 1937, p. 6, col.
1. As a result, Senior Circuit Judge Lewis of the Tenth Circuit, by order of April 14,
1937 assigned administration of the Federal Reserve Insurance Co. receivership to Circuit
Judge Phillips. Order of Assignment reprinted Kansas City Journal-Post, July 23, 1937,
p. 6, col. 2. By order of June 18, Judge Phillips was reassigned to the case until final
adjudication.
In the same year, Senior Circuit Judge Lewis forestalled normal assumption of jur-
isdiction by a district judge of four receivership cases when he designated Circuit Judge
Phillips, on the death of District Judge McDermott, to handle four receiverships which
would have fallen to Judge Hopkins, the only remaining district judge for Kansas.
12. At the request of Judge Hopkins, a sub-committee of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee investigated the Federal Reserve assignment. See note 11 stpra. No action was
taken nor were the hearings reported. For reference to these hearings, see Kansas City
Journal-Post, July 28, 1937, p. 6, col. 1, and Hearings before House Judiciary Commillee
on Additional United States Judges, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 24-5 (1938).
13. Apparently as a result of the Kansas disclosures, two bills limiting the exercise of
authority of § 18 were introduced during the 76th Congress, 1st Session: H.R. 2565 in
January 1939 to amend § 18 to read "when requested to do so, or with the consent of, the
senior district judge ... P" 84 CoNG. REC. 346 (1939), which passed the House, id. at 6610,
but died in the Senate Judiciary Committee; and H.R. 1984 to permit designation only on
the disability of the district court, 84 CONG. REc. 156, which died in the House Judiciary
Committee. H.R. 2566 was reintroduced as H.R. 138, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., and passed the
House, 87 CoxG. RF.. 1068 (1941), again to die in Senate Committee. The accompanying
House Report indicates that Judge Lewis was correctly interpreting his authority under
§ 18: "Circuit judges .. . should not, the committee feel, take cases away from a district
judge . . . the reported bill undertakes to put soome limitations on exislinq law..
(emphasis supplied) H.R. REP. No. 46, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1941).
14. 56 STAT. 1095 (1942), 28 U.S.C. § 22 (Supp. 1943). The amendments of this year
did not concern the provisions here discussed. For the proposition that reenactment acts
as implied legislative approval see Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. 289 U.S. 479, S0 (1933) ;
Old Colony R.R. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 557 (1932) ; McCaughn v. Hershey Choco-
late Co., 283 U.S. 488, 492 (1931).
15. After the judicial practices described in note 9, supra, had been followed for ten
years, Section 18, originally enacted in 1911, was re-enacted, without pertinent change, in
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arguable therefore that Judge Evans was not compelled by prior statutory
construction to limit the authority of Section 18 to depend upon the present
relationship of district judges to cases.
Judge Evans' opinion indicates that, where a judge is presently sitting,
the sufficiency of other remedies substantiates the conclusion that Section 18
is limited in scope to purely administrative assignments where district judges
are unavailable. Misconduct on the part of a district judge may be cor-
rected by removal from office through impeachment. 6 Congress has pro-
vided statutory means for change of venue in a particular case, either by
the judge's own action, 7 or by the petition of the parties through an affidavit
of prejudice.' Error, including abuse of discretion, may be remedied on,
appeal. 19 Furthermore, circuit courts have authority to issue extraordinary
1922. 42 STAT 839 (1922), 28 U.S.C. §22 (1940). During debates on the 1922 amend-
ments to the Judicial Code, designation under this section was reported by the Chairman
of the Senate Judiciary Committee as permissible "whenever [the senior circuit judge]
is satisfied that the occasion therefor exists and that the public interests so require." 62
CONG. Rac. 4852 (1922). Some senators considered this power subject to abuse, but
all proposed amendments were rejected. Id. at 5166-74.
16. U.S. CoxsT. Art. II, § 4. The only Constitutional provision for removing un-
fit judges, impeachment has been widely criticized as an ineffective technique. See
Moore, Judicial Trial and Removal of Federal Judges, 20 Tax. L. Rav. 352 (1942);
Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision, and Removal, 28 Micit. L. REV.
870, 871 (1930); WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 392 (1929);
Potts, Impeachment as a Remedy, 12 ST. Louis L. REv. 15 (1927); 1 BRYcE, AMERICAN
COmmOxWEALTH 212 (1913). For recent attempts to provide an alternative to im-
peachment, see S. 4527, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), H.R. 2271, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1937) and H.R. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941). Impeachment is, of course, not
essentially a remedy provided for the benefit of litigants, although Judge Evans suggests
it may be used as such. 162 F.2d 606, 613.
17. § 20 of the Judicial Code, 36 STAT. 1090 (1911), 28 U.S.C. § 24 (1940) provides
for disqualification of a district judge where, in his opimion, he is "concerned in interest"
in the suit. The extreme discretion left in the trial judge has lessened its effectiveness
as a remedy. See Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L. J. 605, 628 (1947).
18. § 21 of the Judicial Code, 36 STAT. 1090 (1911), 28 U.S.C. § 25 (1940). Filing
an affidavit of prejudice may also prove an ineffectual remedy. Personal hostility and
bias towards a particular party must be shown. Henry v. Speer, 201 Fed. 869 (C.C.A.
5th 1913). Narrow interpretation of the petition's "legal sufficiency" has sharply re-
stricted its usefulness as a change of venue remedy. Cf. In re Lisman, 89 F.2d 898
(C.C.A. 2d 1937), Johnson v. U.S., 35 F.2d 355 (W.D, Wash. 1929), Benedict v.
Seiberling, 17 F.2d 831 (N.D. Ohio 1926); S~e Frank, supra note 17 at 629. But
cf. Whitaker v. McLean, 118 F.2d 596 (App. D.C. 1941). For a discussion of federal
disqualification practice, see Notes, 13 CoRN. L. Q. 454 (1928), 65 U.S.L. Ruv. 68 (1931).
In an ordinary civil action, appeal from denial of an affidavit of prejudice must await
final judgment, and it is by no means clear that such an appeal in bankruptcy must not
also await final judgment. See In re Lisman, slpra at 899; It re Wingert, 22 F. Supp.
483, 484 (D.C. Md. 1938).
19. Circuit courts have jurisdiction to review final decisions of district courts on
appeal. Judicial Code § 128, 36 STAT. 1133 (1911), as amended, 28 U.S.C, § 225 (Supp.
1946). Interlocutory review may be had only under certain circumstances. Judicial
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writs in exercise of their appellate jurisdiction, -° thereby compelling a dila-
tory judge to take action 21 or requiring particular performance where abuse
of discretion has manifested a disregard of duty.2 2 For example, eleven days
prior to the decision in the instant case, a mandamus was directed to Judge
Igoe by the Seventh Circuit to comply with the provisions of the approved
reorganization plan.23 Since adequate procedural devices are thus available
to litigants for protecting their substantive rights, it would seem that Sec-
tion 18 was not intended as an additional weapon in the individual litigant's
already replete procedural arsenal. It would appear that application of the
section rests on criteria apart from the special interests of litigants, even
though it would normally be invoked by them. 4
It does not follow from such a conclusion, however, that the scope of the
Section is limited to docket-clearing assignments. The public interest-the
Code § 129, 36 SxrAT. 1134, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 227 (1940). Appeals in bankruptcy
are governed by NATIOxAL BAxKRUPrCY Acr §§ 24-5, 30 SrAT. 553 (189S), as amended,
11 U.S.C. §§ 47-8 (1940). In bankruptcy proceedings, however, interlocutory review may
generally be had, except in the case of "controversies in bankruptcy." See 2 CoLLn,
BzrxauxiRcy 715 (14th ed., 1940). But the trial court's discretion will, as a general
rule, not be reviewed unless abuse of discretion is shown. Luhrig Collieries Y. Inter-
state Coal and Dock Co., 287 Fed. 711 (C.C.A. 2d 1923), cert. denied sub now. Thosmil
v. Interstate Coal and Dock Co., 262 U.S. 751 (1923) ; In re Margolies, 266 Fed. 203
(C.C.A. 2d 1920); Fox v. Knickerbocker Engraving Co., 165 Fed. 442 (C.C.A. 2d
1908). The remedy of appeal has been criticized in that the "final judgment" rule may
gravely jeopardize the rights of parties. See Crick, Fiml Judgment Rule, 41 YALM
L. J. 539, 553 (1932). In reorganization proceedings it would seem that the senior
circuit judge should give consideration to the deleterious effect which continuous appeal
from orders of a recalcitrant judge must entail.
20. Judicial Code § 262, 36 ST.T. 1162 (1911), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §377 (1940).
FED. R. Cirv. P., 81(b), abolishing writs of mandamus and scire facias, does not apply
to circuit courts. Armour & Co. v. Kloeb, 109 F.2d 72, 73, (C.C.A. 6th 1939), ree'd
on. other grounds, 311 U.S. 199 (1940).
21. McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268 (1910); see United States Y. Byers, 144
F.2d 455, 456 (C.C.A. 2d 1944); Petition of Henneman, 137 F.2d 627, 630 (C.C.A.
1st 1943).
22. In re National Labor Relations Board, 304 U.S. 426 (1938); Ex parte Bradley,
7 Wall. 364 (U.S. 1868) ; Ex parte Crane, S Pet. 190 (U.S. 1831). But a writ may not
be used to control the way in which discretion is exercised. Ex Porte Bradstreet, 7 Pet.
634 (1833); Vacuum Cleaner Co. v. Platt. 196 Fed. 398 (C.C.A. 2d 1912); Cf. Prince
v. Klune, 148 F.2d 18, 19 (App. D.C. 1945). Nor may 14 generally be used to direct
a lower judicial officer how to decide a specified question. See Evaporated Milk Ass'n
v. Roche, 130 F.2d 843, 845 (C.C.A. 9th 1942), rez'd on other grounds, 319 U.S. 21 (1943).
23. Cheston v. Igoe, 162 F.2d 257 (C.C.A. 7th 1947).
24. Whether grounds of complaint are presented to the senior circuit judge pri-
vately or by formal petition, the matter essentially remains one of calling to the latter's
attention existence of certain facts requiring administrative action. Outside interested
parties, however, such as the SEC in corporate reorganizations or the ICC in railroad
reorganizations, might invoke the Section by calling to the senior circuit judge's atten-
tion facts which indicate that the public interest would be best served by appointment of
a circuit judge to take over a district court case.
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express criterion of the Section 25-appears to involve more than the condi-
tion of district court dockets. A more adequate conception of the Section's
function would seem to be that the senior circuit judge is granted authority
to make a broad policy decision based on his theory of what the public
interest requires.2 6
In framing this decision as to what constitutes the public interest, the
senior circuit judge should weigh such considerations as need for prompt and
efficient conduct of litigation,27 correctness of judicial demeanor in district
courts,2 improvement of the machinery of judicial administration 29-in
25. The Supreme Court has definitely stated that the express criterion of the statute
is the public interest. See Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 289 U.S. 479, 501 (1933) ; United
States v. Gill, 292 Fed. 136, 137 (C.C.A. 4th 1923) (where the court stated that the public
interest "is involved in the dispatch of all the business of the courts.").
26. The public interest is to be determined solely by the assigning authority. John-
son v. Manhattan Ry., 289 U.S. 479, 501 (1933). Such determination is not open to
collateral attack. Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., supra; Ex parte American Steel Barrel
Co., 230 U.S. 35, 45 (1913). Cf. People ex rel. Saranac Land & Timber Co. v. Supreme
Court, 220 N.Y. 487, 491, 116 N.E. 384, 385 (1917) ; People v., Ballard, 134 N.Y. 269, 293,
32 N.E. 54, 59 (1892).
27. "Delay in the administration of justice is still the outstanding defect of our
Federal Judicial System," REP. Arr'y GEN. 1 (1937). ". . . [It] has done more than
any one single thing to arouse adverse criticism of the courts." Address of Arthur T.
Vanderbilt before Ohio State Bar Association, Jan. 28, 1938, reported 21 J. Am. JID.
Soc'Y 195, 197 (1938). See address of Chief Justice Taft to American Bar Association,
reported 5 J. A-m. JUD. Sody 37, 38 (1921), and Pound, The Causes of Popular Dis-
satisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP., pt. 1, pp. 395, 408 (1906).
The need for speedy and efficient handling of railroad reorganizations is particularly
important in this connection. "The delay and expense incident to railroad receiverships
and foreclosure sales constituted, probably, the chief reasons which induced passage of
§ 77; and to permit the perpetuation of either of these evils under this new legislation
would be subversive of the spirit in which it was conceived and adopted." Continental
Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 685 (1935).
For discussion of delays in railroad reorganizations, see Dembitz, Progress and Delay
in Railroad Reorganizations Since 1933, 7 LAw & CONTEMtP. PRoD. 393 (1940). Ex-
tended delay has in many cases been detrimental both to the railroad and its security
holders. Will, Railroad Rebrganieaton-The Long and the Short of It, 41 ILL. L, Rsv.
608, 611 (1947).
28. The problem of supervising the conduct of trial judges has provoked much
discussion. They are the judges who have inspired much critical comment concerning
federal courts. Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointnent, Supervision and Removal, 28
MIcH. L. REv. 485, 725 (1930). See address of Chief Justice Hughes to American Lav
Institute, reported 22 A.B.A.J. 374, 376 (1936) ; Kales, Methods of Seleeting and Re-
tiring J udges, 11 J. Am. JUD. Soc'y 133, 143 (1928). Necessity for such supervision
has contributed towards agitation for an alternative to impeachment. See note 16 supra.
"There will be a continuing need for judicial supervision in order to maintain a healthy
condition among the judges." MOORE AND Coc-RILL, BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RESOLuTION
OF AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION FAVORING ENACTMENT BY CoNGREss OF LEGISLATION
PROVIDING FOR TRIALS OF AND JUDGMENTS UPON THE ISSUE OF GOOD BEHAVIOR IN TIIE
CASE OF CERTAIN FEDERAL JUDGES 14 (1941). The Journal of the American Judicature




sum, the retention of public confidence in courts. Although the right of a
sitting district judge to a case depends on no more thafi the district court
rules so appointing him,3 the senior circuit judge must recognize the in-
herent peril in substituting one judge for another. Public interest in the
maintenance of an independent judiciary,3' free from coercion by litigants
and public alike,32 the inevitable blow to the prestige of the district bench,
the loss of efficiency in appointing a judge unfamiliar with the case, and the
adequacy of remedies presently available to litigants are all factors which
mitigate against the frequent use of Section 18 to replace a sitting judge.
Admittedly, only an unusual state of affairs would justify its exercise.33
Had Judge Evans found that Section 18 conferred authority to displace a
sitting district judge, he might justifiably have decided that the facts of the
instant case did not warrant present exercise of that authority. But in con-
cluding that the section could under no circumstances authorize displace-
ment of a sitting judge, this decision seems to impose a needless restriction
on the flexible administration of federal iustice.
29. In addition to legislation enabling courts to regulate their own practice, the
creation of the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, 42 STAT. 838 (1922), as amended,
28 U.S.C. § 218 (1940), and of an Administrative Office for the United States Courts,
53 STAT. 1223 (1939), 28 U.S.C. §§ 444-7 (1940), has effected a substantial improve-
ment in the administrative efficiency of the courts. See Federal Judicial System Nears
End of Reform Program, 24 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 106 (1940). However, an arbitrary re-
striction on the assignment of circuit judges would seem to be "a serious departure from
the policy of promoting a flexible and efficient system for supervising the work of the
federal courts which it was the purpose of the Administrative Office Act to strengthen."
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF SmNoa Cmcurr JUDmEs 7 (1941), in opposing
H.R 138, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941). See note 13 supra.
30. The district judge was assigned to this case by the executive committee of the
district judges for the Northern District of Illinois, acting pursuant to District Rule
21(c). It was an explicit holding of Johnson v. Manhatian Ry., 289 U.S. 479, 503 (1933),
that a circuit judge appointed under § 18 is not obliged to comply with any district court
rule which would prevent him from performing his statutory duty of carrying out the as-
signment.
31. Much of the pressure for amendment to § 18 came from fear that abuse of this
power would undermine the independence of the district bench. See Hearings before
Senate Judiciary Committee on HR. 138, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 64 (1941) and 87 Co~n,.
REC.- 1068 (1941). It has been suggested that adequate safeguard against improper
exercise of this power would be afforded by a provision that assignment be made by
the judicial council of the circuit Rr oRT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERIEN E oP SE---,0o.
Cracuir JuDGEs 7 (1941). But, as has been pointed out, inability to control by flexible
procedure a few offenders may result in more serious threats to the independence of
the federal judiciary. 6ooRE AND CocK-L, op. Cit. supra note 23, at 16.
32. In a rather unusual action, the other district judges of the Northern District of
Illinois filed a memorandum with Judge Evans, while the instant petition was pending,
to the effect that the proceeding was an attempt to coerce the district judge.
33. "In its very nature this power is one which should be sparingly exercised, and
then only in special exigencies and with commensurate care and discretion." Johnson
v. Manhattan Ry., 289 U.S. 479, 504 (1933).
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